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Abstract  12 
In recent years, a number of high profile landslide events have caused disruption, derailments 13 
or damage to railway infrastructure in Great Britain.  A landslide susceptibility model of the 14 
entire railway network was created, designed to give a national overview of potential landslide 15 
hazard originating from Outside Party Slopes.   16 
The current assessment was compiled using Geographic Information System (GIS) techniques 17 
and desktop modelling to apply a structured analysis of each buffered Earthwork Inspection 5 18 
Chain (c100 m). Data analysed along the network included the BGS GeoSure instability model 19 
and newly updated national models for debris flow, earth flow and rock fall, supported by 20 
historic landslide data. In order to further focus the Outside Party Slope zone, a buffer of 21 
External Natural Geological Influence (BENGI) was created using 5 m Digital Terrain Model. 22 
Landslide susceptibility for each Earthwork inspection 5 Chain was categorised using a 23 
‘Classification of Hazards on Outside Party Slopes’ (CHOPS) score; representing the modelled 24 
potential for landslide hazard. 25 
The outputs were combined as a series of matrices to present the CHOPS and Network Rail 26 
Derailment Criticality Band interactions. This research will allow further focused analysis of 27 
the network, in order to prioritise and direct future investigation and policy decisions.  28 
 29 
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 32 
Landslide events within Great Britain (GB) (comprising England, Scotland and Wales) are not 33 
globally comparable as a catastrophic phenomenon when compared with devastating events 34 
widely reported in the media, such as the Sierra Leone landslide in 2017. Neither does GB 35 
experience the frequency of events of countries such as Italy (Guzzetti et al. 2006). Whilst 36 
occasional loss of life is sadly reported (Gibson, et al., 2013) the majority of high profile events 37 
in GB are the result of impacts to infrastructure, affecting the economy and transport routes 38 
(Postance 2017).  39 
GB has, in recent years, experienced a period of wetter than average winters (Pennington et al. 40 
2014) and landscape response has included a number of high profile landslides causing 41 
disruption to rail travel, train derailments or damage to railway infrastructure. Examples of 42 
such high profile cases were documented in the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) 43 
Landslips Class Report 2012/13, published in 2014 (Department of Transport 2014). Events 44 
ranged in size from small wash out failures (St. Bees, Cumbria), through debris flow and train 45 
derailment (Stob Coire; Figure 1) to well publicised large failures causing major track damage, 46 
longer term, disruption and costly remediation (Hatfield Colliery, South Yorkshire). More 47 
recently high profile failures, causing disruption in Lochailort (2016) and derailment at Glen 48 
Finann, (January 2018), both in the Scottish Highlands, gained high levels of media and social 49 
media interest. 50 
A number of the RAIB investigations identified that landslide material originated from slopes 51 
outside of the Network Rail boundary (Department of Transport 2014). Network Rail is 52 
responsible for the monitoring and maintenance of all earthwork assets within its property 53 
boundary. Earthwork assets within the Network Rail boundary are not included when 54 
reviewing outside party slopes. Hazard from Outside Party Slope (OPS), defined as “A cutting, 55 
embankment or natural slope, outside of the Network Rail boundary, owned or managed by an 56 
outside party.” (Network Rail 2017a),  has thus been identified as a key priority for strategic 57 
Network Rail operating plans under standard NR/L2/CIV/086 “Outside Party Slopes 58 
(irrespective of their height) whose failure could pose an unacceptable risk to the safe 59 
operation or performance of railway infrastructure ....” (Network Rail 2017a). Whilst it is 60 
understandable that this is deemed a priority for future management and Route Asset Managers, 61 
the reality is that the full extent of the slopes with the potential to affect the rail network is 62 
likely to be difficult to access and inspect. The rail network of GB comprises approximately 63 
15,445 km of track, traversing a variety of geological formations and terrains which may be 64 
susceptible to future instability.  65 
The British Geological Survey (BGS) has previously collaborated with Network Rail and 66 
partners, to model landslide hazards originating from Outside Party Slopes. Previous research 67 
has included a detailed regional study of a particular route, detailed Digital Terrain Models and 68 
field verification and assessment. This was followed by a feasibility overview of the application 69 
of a single landslide susceptibility model derived through a similar methodology in relation to 70 
the full network (Freeborough et al. 2016).  Both projects proved successful on a local and 71 
national level, however identified a limitation on data and terrain model scales applied to the 72 
national level (Freeborough et al. 2016). The current successful methodology builds and 73 
evolves on both approaches, employing new and improved spatial modelling for differing 74 
landslide types and applying these to the full network at a suitable scale. The final model and 75 
underlying data layers were designed to give a national overview of potential landslide hazard 76 
to Network Rail senior management and individual regional Route Asset Managers, to allow 77 
further more focused analysis of risk to the network.   78 
 79 
Susceptibility maps and historical inventory  80 
Landslides can be divided into different types, according to different failure mechanisms, 81 
geology and geotechnical properties (Cruden & Varnes 1996; Hungr et al. 2014; Figure 2). 82 
Whilst the geology and slope angle control the location and failure type of the landslide, the 83 
degree of strength lost during failure determines the velocity. The failure stage may involve a 84 
kinematic change from sliding to flow or fall, all related to the speed, distance and 85 
destructiveness of the landslide. Cruden & Varnes (1996) proposed separate names for the 86 
movement mode during each stage of a given landslide. Susceptibility modelling provides the 87 
opportunity to identify known characteristics of landslide failures and their associated failure 88 
mechanisms, and thus provide key information and identify areas that may have the potential 89 
to develop instability. 90 
The earthworks across the GB strategic rail network are broken down into distances of 5 Chains 91 
(~100 m), which are referred to as Earthwork Inspection 5 Chains (EI5C). EI5C are used by 92 
Network Rail to subdivide the railway corridor into manageable sections that can be examined 93 
and assessed. To reflect the two sides of a railway corridor, each EI5C has an Up and/or Down 94 
side attributed to it. As this study was requested as a national overview of potential hazard 95 
location, a different phenomenon to hazard pathway or potential risk, the highest ranked 96 
category present within the length of the buffered EI5C was used as the final rating regardless 97 
of percentage coverage. The hazard rating for each Earthwork Inspection 5 Chain was compiled 98 
by calculating and recording the percentage of each A (low) – E (high) category contained 99 
within the EI5C buffer. 100 
 101 
i. GeoSure: Slope Instability (Landslides) 102 
As described in Freeborough et al. (2016), a scientifically based 1:50 000 scale assessment of 103 
the potential susceptibility to natural slope failure at a location is provided by the national 104 
GeoSure: slope instability (Landslides). Data on slope angle, material strength and the known 105 
susceptibility to instability of different lithologies, are combined using a multi-criteria and 106 
heuristic approach; applying a series of rules against the available data to provide a hazard 107 
‘score’ at each location (Lee & Diaz Doce 2014). A high susceptibility score of D or E indicates 108 
that the ground conditions imply a significant potential for future instability via down slope 109 
movement of material (Table 1). The GeoSure Instability Landslides Susceptibility Model 110 
Great Britain (Version 7.0) dataset is produced for use at 1:50 000 scale providing 50 m ground 111 
resolution. For this study further information on the instability of specific Glacial Till 112 
formations was included in the algorithm.  113 
ii. GeoSure Extra: Debris Flow Susceptibility 114 
Areas of potential debris flow hazard are identified in GIS format in the Debris Flow 115 
susceptibility model. Debris flows (Hungr et al. 2014) are a widespread phenomenon in 116 
mountainous terrain and are distinct from other types of landslides as they can occur 117 
periodically on established paths, usually gullies and first- or second-order drainage channels 118 
(Winter et al. 2005) . The mechanism of this particular type of failure is such that potential 119 
locations are not as well represented in the GeoSure methodology. Debris flows in GB are most 120 
commonly found in upland Scotland but also in parts of Wales and the Lake District.  Previous 121 
studies have used debris flow susceptibility methodology developed for the landscape of 122 
Scotland (Winter et al., 2005; Harrison et al. 2008). Requiring a national coverage, and with 123 
increasing availability of data and improvements in process understanding, the BGS developed 124 
a new national product, the Debris Flow Susceptibility Model dataset (Bee et al. 2017). The 125 
dataset is produced for use at 1:50 000 scale providing 50 m ground resolution, and uses inputs 126 
to determine the characteristics of weathering products formed by the underlying geological 127 
materials, slope angle, presence of streams, and indications of infiltration potential (Bee et al. 128 
2017). A high susceptibility score of D or E indicates that the ground conditions imply a 129 
significant potential for future instability via down slope movement of material (Table 1). The 130 
model was correlated with an inventory of 2,000 debris flows (Dashwood et al. 2017).  131 
iii. Earth Flow  132 
In this research the term earth flow is used as the closest to these types of movement and failures 133 
seen on the rail network.  Earth flows are mass movements of fine-grained materials that range 134 
from rapid earth flows formed in highly sensitive clay deposits to relatively slower earth flows 135 
common in fine- grained soils and in some cases, weathered fine-grained rocks such as 136 
mudstones (Sharpe, 1938; Varnes, 1978). Glacial Tills are an extremely heterogeneous range 137 
of deposits, with variations occurring across the country related to topographic region, nature 138 
of the underlying bedrock and depositional processes. Different glacial till (Glacigenic) units 139 
have now been identified and the regional variation in behaviour used in this research. Particle 140 
sizes distribution can range from clay to boulders. Many tills comprise varying proportions of 141 
coarse material in a fine-grained (clay or silt) matrix, whilst others are coarse-grained.  Some 142 
till units contain beds or lenses of sand and gravel (glaciofluvial deposits) and laminated clay 143 
and silt (glaciolacustrine deposits). These beds or lenses can lead to marked variations and local 144 
changes in engineering characteristics. Variations in soil properties such as hydraulic 145 
conductivity within a till unit may result local increases in pore water pressures at the interface 146 
between the coarse-grained and fine-grained material with associated seepage erosion and 147 
flowing of material at the surface. 148 
The heterogeneity of glacial till deposits and the subsequent influence of this on landslide 149 
susceptibility,  was captured in the scoring system for Earth flow which reflects the presence 150 
of sand and gravel lenses and in particular laminated clays and silts within the different till 151 
deposits. Trenter (1999) emphasises the contribution of glaciolacustrine deposits to instability, 152 
due to their lower shear and residual strengths when compared with the bulk of the till unit.   153 
The data on till susceptibility has been combined with a Digital Terrain Model (DTM) and 154 
appropriate slope angle categories to create a refined Earth Flow Susceptibility Model. A high 155 
susceptibility score of D or E indicates ground conditions with a significant potential for future 156 
instability via down slope movement of material (Table 1). 157 
 158 
iv. Rock Fall  159 
Detachment of fragments of strong or hard rock from cliff faces is a common phenomenon in 160 
many areas of GB. A binary data layer was created indicating the potential presence of 161 
susceptible rock. Identification of crags and cliffs using breaks in slope, combined with 162 
engineering property data (Dobbs et al. 2012) and a Digital Terrain Model (DTM) to create an 163 
indicative layer of conditioning factors present within a pixel; indicating present (E) or not (A) 164 
for each pixel processing (Table 1). The binary layer does not take into account the process or 165 
pathway of a rock fragment (i.e. rolling, toppling, sliding), nor does it include jointing or 166 
structural controls which could increase the likelihood of failure. 167 
v. Inventory data and information.  168 
Landslide Inventory information is provided by geological mapping and database sources. 169 
Landslide deposits are spatially represented on the BGS published digital 1:50 000 geological 170 
maps of Great Britain (DiGMap50) after retrospective digitisation of geological maps. 171 
Historically, geological mapping has recorded the location of identifiable landslide deposits as 172 
‘landslip’ on field slips. Due to controlling factors such as: natural landform degradation, 173 
minimum-scale mapping rules, and identifiable visible extents, the physical recording of 174 
deposit detail and classification on a map is not always captured. The National Landslide 175 
Database (NLD) is the most comprehensive inventory of landslide events in GB. The database 176 
currently holds information for over 17 000 records (Pennington et al. 2015).    NLD data are 177 
point based, thus new or small event information can be recorded without a corresponding 178 
spatially mapped deposit. The underpinning Oracle database is linked to an ArcGIS which 179 
displays the NLD landslides as point data.  180 
Each NLD event entry has an identification number (NLD ID) and is documented at a minimum 181 
index level with information on location, name, and full bibliographic reference 182 
(Foster et al. 2012a; Pennington et al. 2015). The source reference may provide further 183 
detailed information which is also included in the record (Foster et al. 2012a).  The NLD is 184 
continually being updated as new events are recorded or reported (Taylor et al. 2015). The 185 
Network Rail failure reporting standard, NR/L3/CIV/185, (previously CIV028; Network Rail 186 
2017b) dataset of earthwork failures on the rail network was also used to cross correlate and 187 
further enrich the NLD information on Outside Party Slope failures.  188 
Using these datasets in parallel, ensured all current BGS records of historic or recent 189 
movement, within the 1 km railway corridor, were included in the model as a landslide 190 
inventory.  191 
 192 
Creation of a terrain guided buffer  193 
Although the model does not address pathway or likelihood of an event affecting the railway, 194 
the included data is limited by the creation of a buffer influenced by the geometry of the terrain 195 
perpendicular to the railway. Previous studies (Foster et al. 2012b) have been carried out using 196 
a BGS generated 1 km buffered corridor along the railway, termed ‘Wavy Buffer’. The wavy 197 
buffer is based on a distance/ catchment rather than assessment of topographical features, 198 
500 m either side of the centre rail line, it is known to overestimate potential hazard. There is 199 
no consideration of pathway or slope determination in the processing of the wavy buffer.  200 
The Network Rail property boundary is removed from the OPS model calculation to avoid 201 
inclusion of Network Rail owned and managed earthworks (embankments and cuttings), (Arup 202 
2015; Power et al 2016) and thus focussing the model on Outside Party Slopes. In order to 203 
further focus the potential Outside Party Slope zone, a Buffer of External Natural Geological 204 
Influence (BENGI) was created using Ordnance Survey Terrain 5 (OST5) DTM interpretation 205 
and a set of terrain rules. The OST5 is a mid-level DTM product from the Ordnance Survey, a 206 
United Kingdom national mapping agency, based on a 5 m grid with a typical accuracy of 2 m 207 
Root Mean Square Error.  208 
The BENGI was created by Network Rail in collaboration with BGS using OST5 to determine 209 
breaks of slope along 1 km cross-sections; 500 m either side of the centre rail line. The 210 
methodology created individual cross sections of maximum 500 m either side of the railway at 211 
20 m intervals perpendicular to the rail line (Figure 3a). Spot heights were added at 10 m 212 
intervals along each cross-section and connected together to create individual slope profiles. If 213 
the angle between two spot heights was greater than 5 degrees this indicated a slope, a change 214 
equal to 5 degrees or less was considered to be flat. Benched slopes on the cross sections were 215 
automatically detected and removed where the slope direction either side of the bench were 216 
identical (cutting, bench cutting, or embankment, bench embankment) and the bench was less 217 
than 30% of the slope length. Slopes occurring within 50 m of the Network Rail property 218 
boundary and/or 50 m from rail centre line were considered, therefore removing large flat 219 
expanses of land and slopes beyond the 50 m limit. A 100 m lateral buffer was applied to each 220 
of the cross sections, to generate a polygon that deliberately exaggerates the total amount of 221 
land where a slope may be present; to accommodate the fact that the methodology does not 222 
model flow path analysis.  223 
Each EI5C has been assigned a final score to represent the potential for landslide hazard termed 224 
the ‘Classification of Hazards on Outside Party Slopes’ (CHOPS) (Figure 3b).  The final 225 
processing combined the maximum susceptibility model score and inventory data in ArcGIS 226 
and was clipped to the BENGI, to assign the CHOPS hazard. Any EI5C determined by the 227 
processing to have no Outside Party Slope are classified as CHOPS_U. This provides a national 228 
overview of modelled potential landslide hazard from Outside Party Slopes for the full network 229 
(Figure 4). 230 
 231 
Outputs  232 
The current assessment was compiled based on Geographic Information System (GIS) 233 
techniques and desktop modelling to adopt a structured analysis of the network, providing a 234 
hazard score for each buffered EI5C. The layers and final results are all scored resulting in a 235 
maximum score of the A- E susceptibility schema; the highest final hazard rating being a 236 
CHOPS_E. The level of potential hazard is not an indication that a damaging event is going to 237 
happen rather an indication of how many causative factors may be present and how severe they 238 
are thought to be. 239 
Research carried out by Network Rail (Arup 2015; Powers et al 2016) assessing the Earthworks 240 
of the strategic network resulted in the refinement in the evaluation of the potential safety 241 
consequences of a train derailment at a given location. This is derived through the Common 242 
Consequence Tool (CCT) (Arup 2015) and takes into account factors such as train speed, 243 
number of tracks at location and track position (potentially increasing the magnitude of the 244 
safety consequence should a derailment occur), in addition to distance to obstacles such as 245 
body of water, tunnel portal or other significant line-side structure. The CCT aims to provide 246 
a consistent means of modelling consequences of derailment for any location; from this is 247 
derived Derailment Criticality Band (DCB). The DCB is recorded as a value 1-5; a score of 0 248 
is assigned where no Earthwork has previously been identified. The final information for each 249 
EI5C are presented spatially in a series of Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc. 250 
(ESRI) shapefiles, the accompanying attribute table, and numerically in Excel spreadsheet 251 
form. The CHOPS score is combined with the Network Rail DCB in a 6 x 5 matrix 252 
configuration presenting scientific interpretation of baseline mapping directly in line with 253 
stakeholder focussed datasets (Figure 5). 254 
Differences between national and regional context reporting is a key communication point for 255 
future focused analysis of the network. When reporting figures in a national versus route 256 
context of EI5C scoring, differences arise in potential interpretation of resulting statistics and 257 
need to be addressed clearly. When evaluating the national overview, 2.49 % of Wales is 258 
reported as CHOPS_ E and 4.08 % in Scotland. On paper this could imply that a greater 259 
consideration should be given to Scotland.  In comparison, on further examination of 260 
information at the regional scale these figure change to 26.24 % for Wales and 23.89 % for 261 
Scotland. When combined with the DCB matrix, just two EI5C lengths in Wales are identified 262 
as both high hazard potential (CHOPS_E) and high DCB (5), providing a final score of E5. In 263 
comparison Scotland identifies fifty-six EI5C with a final score of E5 (Table 2). Further 264 
Network Rail analyses will need to focus on the implications of prioritising potentially lower hazard 265 
score, but a higher DCB score.  266 
 267 
Conclusions  268 
Outside Party Slope hazard identification is a key priority for Network Rail operating plans, 269 
however the full extent of network slope is likely to be difficult to access and inspect. This 270 
research offers a national overview of the full strategic network. The model is a desk-top tool 271 
to aid site prioritisation for the next phase of route investigations and funding. It is not a risk 272 
map and should not be used as such. A high hazard score within the model does not 273 
necessarily translate to a high risk; there is no interpretation of likelihood, preventative 274 
construction or hazard management schemes in place. Nor does the model assess the cost of a 275 
hazard being realised or the exposure to assets or people. The hazard score only examines the 276 
conditions that leave an area predisposed to a hazard occurring, based on the geological 277 
mapping at the location. The data on the models should not be used as a definitive measure of what 278 
is at a given a location, but rather as an indication of what may be there. The data are, of course, not 279 
intended as a replacement for detailed site-specific studies or Route Asset Manager knowledge. The 280 
research and future liaison with Route Asset Managers will enable strategically focused 281 
analysis of the network, in order to prioritise and direct future investigation and policy 282 
decisions. 283 
This is emerging Research & Development with which the BGS have assisted Network Rail in 284 
understanding natural hazards using mapped geology products and digital terrain models. This 285 
research has been undertaken as ongoing continuous improvement to understand the potential 286 
threats from land beyond the immediate railway infrastructure.  The evolution of understanding 287 
from natural threats beyond the land owned by Network Rail is a significant step forward. 288 
However, the baseline assessment that has been undertaken is not yet ready for immediate 289 
integration into the infrastructure owners’ policy or standards framework. Further validation, 290 
review and consideration are now needed to ascertain the best way of proportionally 291 
incorporating potential threats from natural slopes into the already challenging area of 292 
geotechnical asset management.  293 
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 372 
Figure Captions  373 
Fig. 1. Derailment of train at Stob Coire Sgriodian, Scottish Highlands 28.06.2012, caused by 374 
a shallow planar landslide that developed into a Debris flow (©NERC)  375 
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of the classification of landslide type after Cruden and Varnes 376 
(1996) (©NERC) 377 
Fig. 3. A schematic representation of the Outside Party Slope final Earthwork Inspection 5 378 
Chain (EI5C) sections using the Buffer of External Natural Geological Influence (BENGI). 379 
Any cross section within Network Rail property or a spot of change of less than 5 degrees is 380 
excluded from the analysis). 381 
Fig. 4. National output of the Outside Party Classification of Hazards on Outside Party Slopes 382 
research, presenting the maximum hazard score for each Earthwork Inspection 5 Chain for 383 
Great Britain (©NERC) 384 
Fig. 5. Graphic representation of Classification of Hazards on Outside Party Slopes (A – E) 385 
and Derailment Criticality Band (0 - 5) matrices results.  386 
Table 1. Text descriptions for the A-E hazard ratings of the landslide susceptibility models 387 
used in the assessment of the rail network 388 
Table 2.  Example data extract showing regional route analysis of final matrices Classification 389 
of Hazards on Outside Party Slopes (CHOPS) score (C- E) and Derailment Criticality Band 390 
(DCB) (4 and 5). 391 
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Debris flows are not thought 
to occur.  
This is due to a lack of 
available slope materials, 
high drainage rates or low 
slope angle.  
Earth flow failures are not 
thought to occur.  
Till deposits are not thought 
to be present or till deposits 
are present but considered 
not susceptible to failure due 
to very low slope angles.  
Factors contributing to a 
potential rock fall hazard are 
not indicated as being 
present within this pixel  
 
B   Slope instability problems 
are not likely to occur 
Slope instability problems are 
not likely to occur, but 
potential problems of 
adjacent areas impacting on 
the site should always be 
considered. 
 
Debris flows are not likely to 
occur.  
This is either due to a limited 
availability slope materials, 
sufficient drainage rates or 
low slope angles.  
Earth flow failures are not 
likely to occur.  
Low to moderately 
susceptible till deposits are 
present, but earth flow type 
failures are not likely to occur 
due to controlling slope 
angles.  
‐  
C   Slope instability problems 
may be present or 
anticipated.  
Site investigation should 
consider specifically the slope 
stability of the site. 
Debris flows may be present 
or anticipated.  
The combinations of 
increasing slope angle, poor 
drainage condition and the 
presence of available material 
may increase the potential 
for failures to occur.  
 
Earth flow failures may be 
present or anticipated.  
Earth flow failures may be 
anticipated due to 
moderately susceptible 
lithology and potentially 
controlling slope angles.  
‐ 
D   Slope instability problems 
are probably present or have 
occurred in the past.  
Land use should consider 
specifically the stability of the 
site. 
Debris flows are probably 
present or have occurred in 
the past.  
The combinations of steep 
slopes, poor drainage 
conditions and an increased 
presence of available material 
suggest that debris flows are 
likely to be present at these 
sites.  
 
Earth flow failures are likely 
to be present.  
Slopes at this location are 
particularly susceptible to 
earth flow failures due to the 
moderate – high susceptible 
tills and indicated controlling 
slope angles.  
‐ 
E   Slope instability problems 
almost certainly present and 
may be active.  
Significant constraint on land 
use.  
 
Debris flows are highly likely 
to be present.  
The heightened combinations 
of steep slopes, poor 
drainage conditions and the 
presence of available material 
suggest that debris flows are 
highly likely to be present at 
these sites.  
Earth flow failures are highly 
likely to be present.  
Slopes at this location are 
particularly susceptible to 
Earth flow failures due to the 
presence of highly 
susceptible tills and indicated 
20 ‐35 degree slope angle.  
 
Factors contributing to a 
potential rock fall hazard are 
indicated as being present 
within this pixel:  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptions for hazard ratings of the landslide susceptibility models used in the 
assessment of the rail network 
 
  
 
 
  Hazard rating score (CHOPS and DCB) 
Regional 
Network Rail 
Route 
C3  C4  C5  D3  D4  D5  E3  E4  E5  Total extract count 
Anglia  159  91  44  11  5  3  14  0  0  327 
LNEEM  820  561  308  184  108  43  233  164  106  2527 
LNW  896  748  450  294  135  85  188  114  73  2983 
Scotland  544  355  180  236  133  59  342  139  56  2044 
South East  337  75  159  55  12  35  149  27  62  911 
Wales  88  33  19  23  16  7  28  23  2  239 
Wessex  233  29  15  33  7  0  89  9  2  417 
Western  828  368  120  138  71  25  200  124  85  1959 
Total extract 
count  3905  2260  1295  974  487  257  1243  600  386  11407 
 
Table 2.  Example data extract showing regional route analysis of final matrices Classification 
of Hazards on Outside Party Slopes (CHOPS) score (C- E) and Derailment Criticality Band 
(DCB) (4 and 5) 
 






